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ABSTRACT 
Overexploitation and severe depletion of marinefisheries resources in Southeast Asia continue to be a 
source of great concern to many regional fisheries managers. The fact that ASEAN countries bordering 
these waters are highly depended upon marine fisheries as the main source ofrevenue, enzployment, and 
food securiw, it is crucial for them to address these fisheries problems. This is especially the case with 
respect to the management and conservation of commercially importont shared pelagic fish stacks, 
part~cularly in the South China Sea and Celebes Sea As the spatial migratory range of these stock 
transcends across many politically draw maritime zones of littoral States, it is highly imposs~ble for one 
State, acting independently, would be able to manage these fisheries effectively within its own national 
jurisdichon Perhaps the best approach in dealing with this problem is through collective management 
and conservation offish stocks. Hence, this paper examines interstate cooperative arrangement for the 
management of shared fishery stocks among ASEAN countries. It begins by providing brief definition, 
biological and migratory profile of transboundary shared stocks. The second part covers existing 
international legal and policy framework that embraces the principle of interstate cooperation for 
managing such stocks. Finally, the paper provides recommendations of how ASEAiV member States can 
address the issues and challenges of managing sharedfish stocks in a more holistic and coordinated 
manner withzn the framework of interstate cooperahon 
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INTRODUCTION 
The growing depletion and overexploitation of marine fisheries resources in numerous offshore and 
coastal fishing grounds of Southeast Asia have been a source of great concem to both regional fisheries 
managers and policymakers. Nowhere of these problems are more acute than in the Malacca Straits, 
South China Sea, and the Gulf of Thailand (Stobutzki et al., 2006; Pauly & Thia-Eng, 1988, p. 202). A 
number of works in the literature reveal a multitude of factors contribute to the declining trend of these 
aquatic resources. Among these factors include the use of destructive fishing gears and methods, 
excessive fishing capacity, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, degradation of marine 
ecosystems and habitats, to ineffective national fisheries management policies and systems (Morgan, 
Staple, & Funge-Smith, 2007; Wilkinson, Caillaud, Vantier, & South, 2006; Morgan, 2006; Thia-Eng et 
al., 2000). This alarming trend has an adverse repercussion, threatening not only the conservation and 
sustainable use of fish stocks, but also the long-term viability of regional marine fisheries industry in 
general. 
One must recognize that marine captured fisheries industry is of great importance to many littoral States 
in Southeast Asia. To the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
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bordering the regional seas - Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippine, fisheries sector has long 
been the principal source of revenue, livelihood, and food security. All four countries are traditionally 
known as a major fishing nation, and for over the past ten years, the last three consistently ranked among 
the top ten fisheries producers in the world (FAO, 2010, p. 13; Pew Environment Group, 2010). In t e r n  
of employment, roughly 100 million people in the region are directly depended on fisheries, either 
involved as fishermen or engaged in supporting fisheries industries. In the Celebes Sea, for example, 
Palma and Tsamenyi (2008) stated that fisheries resources provide employment to nearly 20 million 
people who live inthe surrounding sea (p. 9). 
Substantial social-economic gains generated from the already dwindling marine fish stocks entail the 
adoption of a more viable and sound cooperative fisheries management regime that transcends across 
political boundaries. Through joint management among these ASEAN members, the desirable common 
long-term goals of achieving sustainable, healthy fisheries and rebuilding depleting stocks can finally be 
attained. This is especially case with respect to the conservation of transboundary shared fish stocks. In 
view that the migratory range of such stocks typically spreads across politically drawn maritime 
jurisdictional zones of more than one State, a meaningful ways for the affected States to sustainably 
manage the stocks is highly likely through their collaborative efforts. 
This paper intends to examine the nature and extent of interstate cooperative measures currently in place 
at regional level to manage transboundary shared fish stocks of Southeast Asia. It will examine interstate 
cooperative arrangement for the management of shared fishery stocks among ASEAN countries. The 
paper begins by providing brief defintion, biological and migratory profile of transboundary shared 
stocks. The second part covers existing international legal and policy kamework that embraces the 
principle of interstate cooperation for managiog such stocks. It is, however, beyond the scope of this 
paper to explore the effectiveness of these cooperative management measwes and international 
framework in terms of achieving their objectives. Finally, the paper offers recommendations of how 
ASEAN members can address the issues and challenges of managing shared fish stocks in a more holistic 
and coordinated manner within the framework of interstate cooperation. 
PROFILE OF TRANSBOUNDARY SHARED FISH STOCKS IN SOUiHEAST ASIA 
Before one proceed with the detailed discussion on transboundary shared fish stocks, it is essential to 
understand f is t  the terminology of "shared stocks," as well as biological and migratory profile of the 
stocks, particularly from the perspective of Southeast Asia. 
DEFINITION 
There is currently no universally accepted and accurate terminology and category of shared fish stocks. 
However, a number of writers do provide the aforementioned terminology and category. Martosubroto 
(1998), for example, simply referred "shared stocks" in the context of South China Sea as of those 
transboundary stocks shared by countries on a bilateral or multilateral basis @. 154). Meanwhile, Caddy 
(1997) defines "shared stocks" as followed: 
... a group of commercially exploitable organisms, distributed over, or migrating across, 
the maritime boundary between two or more national jurisdictions, or the maritime 
boundary of a national jurisdiction and the adjacent high seas, whose exploitation can 
only be managed effectively by cooperation between the States cone emed... (as cited in 
Munro, Van Houtte, & Wilmam, 2004, p. 3). 
Different categories of shared stocks can also be traced to several published reports and technical papers 
issued by the Food and Agriculture of the United Nations (FAO). One particular FA0 fisheries technical 
paper provides such categorization (Munro, Van Houtte, & Willmann 2004): 
(i) fish resources crossing the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boundary of one 
coastal State into the EEZ(s) of one, or more, other coastal States- transboundary 
stocks; 
(ii) highly migratory species, as set forth in Annex 1of the 1982 UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (LOSC), consisting primarily of the major tuna species 
(being highly migratory in nature, the resources are to be found, both within the 
coastal State EEZ, and the adjacent high seas); 
(iii) all other fish stocks (with the exception of anadromous/catadromous stocks) that 
are to be found, both within the coastal State EEZ and the adjacent high seas - 
straddling stocks; and 
(iv) fish stocks to be found exclusively in the high seas- discrete high seas fish stocks. 
A further note of caution should be added that certain fish stocks can be interchangeably classified to 
different categories of stocks mentioned above. As such, Van Houtte (2003) argued that the absent of 
precise categorization and definitive, universally accepted terminology of shared stocks is a source 
confusion (pp. 30-31). For the purpose of this paper, it only deals with "transboundary shared fishery 
stocks" - similar stocks or stocks of associated species occurring within two or more territorial seas/EEZs 
of coastal States. 
Biological Feature and Spatial Distribution 
Fisheries inhabiting the tropical waters of Southeast Asia are typically complex and highly diversified in 
terms of their species composition; with the demersal and pelagic fishes represent the most dominant 
species of transboundary shared stocks in the region. Despite of being less mobile than pelagic species 
and commonly found in relatively shallow coastal waters, demersal species can be categorized as "shared 
stocks" by virtue of their geographical distribution that extends across boundaries of several national 
jurisdictional waters. Specifically, FAOISEAFDEC report implies that the stocks of demersal fishes 
should be categorized as transboundary shared stocks if their fishing grounds encompass the boundaries 
of two EEZs claimed by different littoral States (FAOISEAFDEC, 1985, p. 2). Key examples of such 
species or species group of demersal include snappers (Luganus spp.), threadfin breams (Nemlpterus 
spp.), groupers (Ep~nephalus spp.), and croakers (Pennahia spp.). Trawl nets, stationary traps and lift 
nets are among the most frequently deployed fishing gears to capture these species. 
Transboundary shared fish stocks can also be divided into pelagic species. Based on a general survey of 
national catch statistical data of ASEAN countries, a sizable number of small pelagic species are typically 
caught in the regional waters. The most common species include mackerels (Rastrelliger spp.), round 
scads (Decapterus spp.), anchovies (Engraulidae spp.), Spanish mackerels (Scomberonrarus spp.), and 
hardtail scads (Megalaspis cordyla spp.). Other dominant species under the category of transboundary 
shared stocks are tuna species. These species are mostly comprised of neritic tunas that include longtail 
tuna (Thunnus tonggol spp.), frigate tuna (Amis thazard spp.), bullet tuna (Amis rochei spp.), and 
kawakawa (Euthynnus afinrs spp.). Depending on their locations and weathers, these pelagic species are 
predominantly caught by purse seines, hook and lines and gillnets. 
As pointed out earlier, the geographical range of transboundary shared fish stocks of Southeast Asia 
extends across the boundaries between two or more maritime jurisdictional zones (e.g. EEZ, archipelagic 
waters, and territorial sea). Given their migratory characteristic, shared fish stocks, as rightly affirmed by 
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Williams (2007, p. 3), "show no regards for national borders." The distribution corridors of demersal and 
pelagic stocks in the region overlap several national maritime jurisdictional zones (e.g. territorial seas, 
EEZs) claimed by two or more States. The spatial range of demersal fish stocks movement is typical in 
the Gulf of Thailand, Andaman Sea, Northwest of Borneo, Gulf of Tonkin, and Sunda Shelf. For 
example, shrimp stocks such as penaeid shrimps can be found in the coastal waters between the maritime 
boundaries of Thailand and Malaysia in the northern corridor of the Malacca Straits, and between 
Cambodia and Thailand in the northern Gulf of Thailand (Martosubroto, 1998, p. 156). For shared pelagic 
stocks, their distribution range in the regional waters can be divided into several corridors, with each of 
them overlapping national maritime jurisdictional areas of more than one single State (Yanagawa, 1998). 
Hardtail scads and round scads are found between the EEZ waters of Vietnam and Thailand in the Gulf of 
Tonkin, the territorial seas of Malaysia and Thailand in the Malacca Straits, and Thailand and Vietnam 
EEZs in the Gulf of Thailand. Mackerels are shared in the EEZ waters of the Malacca Straits (Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Thailand), Gulf of Thailand to Singapore (Thailand and Malaysia), Gulf of Tonkin 
(Vietnam and Thailand), and Andaman Sea (Thailand and Malaysia). The distribution range of round 
scads covers the Malacca Straits, Gulf of Thailand to Sunda Shelf, and eastern South China Sea 
(FAOISEAFDEC, 1985, p. 6). 
BEYOND INDIVIDUAL STATE-CENTRIC APPROACH IN FISHERIES RESOURCE GOVERNANCE 
Dictated by the limits of its jurisdictions, rights and authorities, a coastal State has the discretion and 
flexibility in determining how fisheries resources in the seas adjoining its coast are to be developed and 
managed. Garcia and Hayashi (2000) suggested that such approach to marine resource governance is a 
result from the current partition of oceanic frontiers into several distinct zones of national jurisdiction, 
extending seaward up to a distance of 200-nautical mile (or more) from the territorial sea baseline (p. 
468). This concept of spatial division of national jurisdiction defined by demarcation lines or boundaries 
is sanctioned by the LOSC. Under the Convention, States are accorded with the rights and duties within 
each maritime zone to protect and manage fisheries resources and their surrounding marine environment 
this jurisdictional delineation of maritime space dictates the manner in which coastal and fishing States 
formulate and implement their fisheries policies and regulations. 
No other maritime jurisdictional zone recognised by the LOSC has made substantial transformation to 
international legal and policy framework for marine fisheries management more than the EEZ regime. 
The universal claim to this extended zone radically transformed the distribution pattern of global marine 
capture fisheries, with substantial portions of the world's exploitable marine fisheries resources are now 
fall under the exclusive control of coastal States. By virtue of the EEZ regime found in Part V of LOSC, 
coastal States enjoy socio-economic gains obtained from the preferential rights and greater access to the 
fisheries resources created by the regime. Coastal States also have the sovereign rights and considerable 
discretion under Article 61(2) of the Convention in determining the manner in which fisheries resources 
are to be utilized and developed, but fell short of having the right to overexploit or deplete them. In 
relation to this, Edeson (2005) asserted that the considerable benefits obtained by coastal States from such 
exploitation are being balanced by their regulatory and enforcement responsibility to protect and conserve 
these resources. Coastal States are not only direct beneficiaries but also regulators of fishing activities and 
marine living resources, including species of fish with their migratory range extending into the EEZs of 
other countries (Hey, 1999, p. 22). 
In reality, however, the above fisheries management framework has not been able lo fully achieve its 
objective due to the inherent weakness of the convention's provisions, combined with the failure of 
States to effectively exercise their obligations of protecting fishery stocks effectively (Juda, 1997, p. 148). 
According to R a y h e  (1999), the jurisdictional kamework embedded in the EEZ regime of LOSC has 
proven to be an "inappropriate mechanism for the resolution of fisheries conservation and management 
issues" (p. 11 1). The enclosure of vast offshore marine areas under the coastal States' EEZ jurisdiction 
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did not deliver the expected conservation benefits needed to address the problem of overfishing and 
environmental degradation (Matt, 1976; as cited in Tangsubkul & Fung-Wai, 1983, p. 9). Nor did the 
regime provide greater incentive for States to be more responsible in the way they utilized and managed 
fish stocks. 
REASONS TO PURSUE COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT OF SHARED FISHERY STOCKS 
The underlying weakness of LOSC's fisheries framework lies behind its emphasis on a zonal approach to 
manage marine fisheries. As stated earlier, this particular approach has largely failed to overcome the 
continuing deterioration of commercially important transboundary fisheries populations. This 
ineffectiveness is one that is intrinsically linked to the universal partition of oceans and seas under 
multiple, functional jurisdictional zones established under the Convention. The approach to manage 
fisheries resources within the spatial perimeter of States' jurisdictional zones disregards both the temporal 
and biological distribution of various species of fish, along with the ecological interaction between the 
fish stocks and their surrounding marine ecosystem (Kirk, 1999, p. 69). Churchill and Lowe (1999) have 
observed that the Convention's EEZ regime on fsheries seems to "convey the impression that most of the 
fish stocks only confine themselves to the EEZ of a single State" (p. 294). In reality, Hoe1 and Kvalvik 
(2006) asserted that the boundary lines of EEZs in many parts of the world rarely coincide with the 
natural migratory boundaries of shared fish stocks. Both commentators also concluded that the poor 
institutional fit between the migratory nature of the stocks and the legal boundary set of maritime 
jurisdictional zones raises the question on the validity of the LOSC's zonal management approach as an 
effective regime for achieving the long-term conservation and sustainable utilization of transboundary 
shared fish stocks. 
As can be recalled, it is impossible for a single State alone to implement effective and holistic 
management measures for shared fish stocks within its own national waters. Even if an individual State 
has adopted and enforced stringent conservation and regulatory measures for these shared stocks under its 
jurisdiction, there is always the possibility that these national initiatives would be hampered by ineffective 
conservation effort and uncontrolled fishing in the EEZ of other States (Tangsubkul and Fung-Wai, 
1983, p. 875). In relation to this, if there is incompatibility of conservation regime for shared fish stocks 
in one side ofjurisdictional areas and with those on the other side of borders, Xue (2005) affrmed that the 
risk of mismanagement andlor inequality could deprive the involving States from gaining the 111 benefits 
of exploiting such stocks. This situation, which is currently happening in the Southeast Asian waters, 
could detrimentally affect the quality and quantity of shared species. A new approach in resource 
management governance is needed, one which involved joint efforts involving ASEAN members sharing 
the same stocks, either directly with the concerned States sharing the same stocks or through regional 
fisheries organization. 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE MANAGEMENT SHARED FISH 
STOCKS 
The principle of interstate cooperation in the management and conservation of marine fisheries, either 
directly with other State@) or through regional fsheries organization, represents one of the cornerstones 
of responsible fisheries management. This particular principle can be found many multilateral treaties, 
non-binding instruments and resolutions. Mostly adopted under the purview of the FA0 or the United 
Nations, some notable instruments include the LOSC, 1992 Declaration of the International Conference 
on Responsible Fishing and the 1995 FA0 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Additional set of 
voluntary instruments that made indirect reference to cooperative measures in fisheries resource 
protection and law enforcement are found in the four non-binding International Plans of Actions (IPOAs). 
These instruments individually deal with specific issues in fisheries management that explicitly cover 
seabird by-catch, fishing capacity, shark management, and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing. Of these four instruments, IPOA-IUU and IPOA-Capacity are of most relevance in promoting 
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State's engagement in interstate cooperation applicable to the conservation of transboundary shared 
stocks. 
LOSC 
Arguably the closest reference to global legally-binding kamework requiring States to cooperate in the 
conservation and development of shared fish stocks is found in the LOSC. The Convention apparently 
affirms the requirement for coastal States to pursue cooperative arrangement when dealing with the 
conservation of transboundary fish stocks shared between their EEZs. This is evident in Article 63(1). 
Where the same stock or stocks of associatedspecies occur within the exclusive economic 
zones of two or more coastal States, these States shall seek, either directly or through 
appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures 
necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such stocks 
without prejudice to the otherprovisiom of this Part, 
Furthermore, States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea are duty bound under Articles 123 of 
LOSC to cooperate on various areas relating to f~heries conservation and management. Albeit the same 
article does not provide explicit reference to any specify category of fish stocks, it does applies to all 
marine fisheries. Hence, one can assume that this legal provision covers transboundary shared stocks. For 
this reason, this provision can be directly applied to many Southeast Asian States bordering the regional 
semi-enclosed seas, such as the South China Sea and Celebes Sea. Within these vast expanse seas, the 
national EEZs of these States abound with those stocks. According to Article 123(a) of the Convention, 
coastal States have the specific duty to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and 
exploitation of fsheries resources. The areas of coordination also include the protection and preservation 
of marine environment (Art. 123(b)), and scientific research policies (Art. 123 (c)). 
NON-BINDING FISHERIES-RELATED INSTRUMENTS 
Besides the LOSC, several non-binding fisheries-related instruments promote and encourage interstate 
cooperation directed to the conservation and management of fisheries resources, including transboundary 
shared stocks. With the exception of the FA0 Code of Conduct, the following instruments - the 1992 
Declaration of Cancun, IPOA-IW and IPOA-Capacity - do not contain explicit reference of the need for 
States to cooperate in the conservation and management of transboundary shared fishery stocks. They do, 
however, contain provisions that encourage States to cooperate in fisheries-related matters, which one can 
assume to be applicable to the conservation and protection of shared fishery stocks. 
According to 1992 Declaration of Cancun, one the central elements of promoting responsible f~heries is 
for States to cultivate cooperation at international level. The recommended scope and activities of these 
cooperative fisheries management arrangement are varied. It includes fostering international cooperation 
and collaboration on matters relating to joint research, and facilitating the transfer and exchange of 
technological information on matters relating to fsheries (para. 16). Other suggested areas of cooperative 
arrangement that State can undertake include eliminating illegal fishing (para.18), and providing financial 
support required to improve surveillance and enforcement capacity in exercising their sovereign rights 
(para. 17). 
The non-biding requirement for the littoral States to undertake cooperative measures in fisheries has also 
found its way in the FA0 Code of Conduct. Consistent with the objective of the Code, States are 
encouraged to cultivate and support cooperation, either directly or through regional organization, in aU 
matters pertaining to fisheries (Art. 2(e)). Such cooperation may involve neighboring States to facilitate 
the sustainable use of coastal resources and the conservation of the environment (Art. 10.3.1). Unlike the 
UN Fish Stocks, the scope of the requirement for interstate cooperation established under the Code are 
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much broader, encompassing not only different types of fisheries (including inland fisheries) but also all 
categories of migratory fish species, such as shared stocks, straddling stocks and highly migratory fish 
stocks, and high seas fish stocks (Art. 7.1.3). In achieving this, the level of cooperation is not restricted to 
bilateral mangement involving States sharing the same stocks but rather expanded to sub-regional or 
regional fisheries organization or arrangement (Art. 7.1.5). As endorsed by the Code, another of form of 
cooperative arrangements relevant for the protection of transboundary shared fish stocks is for the 
concerned States to ensure the compatibility of fisheries conservation and management measures in the 
EEZs and beyond their national jurisdiction (see Arts. 6.1.2 and 7.3.2). 
IPOA-IUU has been developed within the framework of the FA0 Code of Conduct. The measures 
outlined in the former do not deal directly with transboundary fish shared fish stocks per se, but rather 
specifically address numerous issues of IUU fishing. Even one should realiie that irresponsible, 
destructive practices and behaviors of fishermen and fishing operators engaged in TUU fishing, 
nonetheless, if occurred in the EEZs may cause harmful effect in terms of jeopardizing the biological 
population of transboundary shared stocks. A closer examination on the text of IPOA-IUU shows the 
considerable important of State to cooperate and coordinate directly or through regional fisheries 
organization in combating this irresponsible fishing practice. A list of suggested activities or areas of 
cooperation can be found under the title: Cooperation between States. One critical area involving 
interstate cooperation in combating IUU fishing is the exchange and sharing of information and data 
(para. 51.2). Specifically, States should exchange and share information on the detailed profile of 
authorized fishing vessels (Para. 28.2); fishing-related activities (para. 28.2) and vessels engaging in IUU 
Fishing (para. 80.4). States are also encouraged to share information that deal with law enforcement 
activities, specifically control, monitoring and surveillance (MCS) matters (para. 28.7). In sum, it appears 
that the provisions under the IPOA-IUU that promote interstate cooperation in fisheries management, 
surveillance and law enforcement attest the instrument's relevancy in contributing the development of the 
international normative and policy framework with the aim of ensuring long-term sustainability of fish 
stocks, including transboundary fish stocks, through fisheries cooperative arrangement. 
RECOMMENDED INTERSTATE COOPERATNE MEASURES FOR SHARED FISH STOCKS IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
A number of bilateral and regional cooperative mechanisms or programs on fisheries-related matters are 
currently in place in Southeast Asia. Such joint initiatives, nevertheless, remain arguably inadequate and 
often less meaningful in attaining the long term goals of effective conservation and sustainable 
development of fish stock shared across various States' maritime jurisdictions. In terms of 
implementation, cooperative fisheries management regime in the region is still confronted with many 
institutional and policy challenges. For this reason, the following measures are recommended for the 
ASEAN members to undertake in strengthening the existing cooperative arrangement: 
EXCHANGING AND DISSEMINATING INFORMATION AND DATA 
There is a need for ASEAN members sharing the same fish stocks to foster and establish cooperation and 
collaboration in various fields of research activities, especially on marine fisheries resources and 
oceanography, and their ecosystem components. This cooperative arrangement should also be broadened 
to include analysis, transferring, dissemination and exchange of information and data acquired &om 
research activities. In recent years, most of the regional partnerships directed toward the conservation and 
protection of shared fishery resources are centred upon the pivotal role played by regional 
intergovernmental advisory bodies, such as the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center 
(SEAFDEC) and Asia-Pacific Fisheries Commission (APFC). Perhaps the most successful and concrete 
regional research initiatives directed toward the conservation of such stocks are of those instigated under 
the purview of SEAFDEC. Based in Kuala Terengganu, Malaysia, it has taken the function of initiating, 
coordinating and implementing joint research projects and programs toward the conservation of 
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commercially important fish stocks and endangered marine ecosystem and its habitat in the South China 
Sea and Andaman Sea. Research focus of the oqanhtion are mainly on the population asses~ments of 
fish stocks and endangered aquatic species (e.g. marine turtle and sharks), health status of marine 
ecosystem and its habitat, and migtatory patim of selected small pelagic species. Recent exampIes of 
mearch projects funded by the Japanese Trust Funds QTF) program include the ''Tagging Program for 
Economically Important Pelagic Species in the South China Sea and Andaman Sea,'' and "Research for 
Stock Enhancement of Sea Turtles in the Southeast Asian Region" (Kadir & Yaacob, 2007; Kadu 62 
Ahe, 2010). 
Another important field of research initiatives set up by SEAFDEC is the development of selective, 
environmentally safe fishing gears. Through the expertise sharing and cooperation with its member 
countries, SEAFDEC has successllly developed and tested a number of suitable types of Kvtle 
excludiig devices' (TEDs) that could minimize incidental catch of marine turtles (Matic, 1997, p. 243). 
At national level, both Malaysia and Thailand have individually conducted experimental trial on these 
TEDs to test their suitability and efficiency for their respective shrimp fshing trawler fleet, without 
si@canfly reducing catch rate or increasing fuel consumption during fishing operation. 
Notwithstanding the existence of coordinated research programs in marine environment and fisheries. 
wnspicuom missing is the available information on the latest knowledge and trend on the biological and 
ecological parameters of certain transboundary shated stocks. According to Doulman (200% reliable 
timely and accurate information on marine f~hsries and biodiversity within the regional seas are 
kdamental for policy deliberation and for the sustainable management and conservation of %h shwks 
and figherim ecosystem (p. 204). In the context of Southeast Asian region, such information are generally 
inadequate, if not unavailable. And yet, the governments and stakeholder communities have no choice 
bur rely heavily on this questionable data as part of their policy planning and decision-making process. 
Of varied mwom attributing to this problem, marine scientific research is a difficult, time mnsuming and 
costly exercise (William, 2007, p. 50). Confronted with limited financial, technical or humancapacity, it 
is indeed a daunting task for many developing littoral States in the region to individually condo& marine 
scientific research on tropical marine fiheries and ecosystems, as well as studies on oceanogmphic and 
climatic variations affecting regional fisheries (Alam,Omar, & Squires, 2002, p. 336). 
One of the main challenges hampering the attainment sustainable management of shared fish stocks in the 
regional water of Southeast Asia is the questionable catch statistical database operated in each individual 
State. A significant banier in determining accwale wstahble harvesting limits for specific species 
gmups of sbared stocks can be in part explained by the inefficient catch reporting and capacity assessment 
mechanism at national level. For example, in the context of Indonesia's dispersed multi-gear and 
multispecies fisheries, statistics on catch rates are very difficult to collect due to outdated samplmg 
system for collecting fisheries statistics (Mom et al., 2005, p. 262). The problem of incomplete 
statistical data and information is also aggravated by the deficiency of financial and human capacity 
which is a prerequisite to monitor and compile fishery landings effectively. 
Another obstacle to sustainable fisheries management i s  the unavailability of accurate information and 
data of the a c i d  amount of shared fish stocks and specim composition caught by both local and foreign 
fishing fleets in national waters. This deficiency includes the exact quantity of catches unloaded in the 
latt@r h m e  countries. The problem of u~demprted ca@hes for statistical purposes is more a c e  on 
pelagic sfocks of longtail tuna species, which are charste'zed by their migratory nature inhabiting 
seyeral EEZs of c~untries bordering the South China Sea (Yonemori, Yanagawa, & Pon& 1996). 
Compounding this problem is the difficulty of regional fisheries manager to trace the actuaI catch e f f m  
by fishing vessels engaged in unauthorized fishing activities, namely IUU fishing, in the regional wafers 
(Varkey, Aioswortb, Pitcher, Goram, & Sumaila, 2010, p. 228; Willouhby, Monintja, & Badrudii 1999). 
As way back as the late 1990s, information colhted independently by, and found in the national 
inventory of regional States has been reportedly lacking in tams of their comprehensiveness (Sailctig 
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and Boonragsa, 1998, p. 135). Even if the inventory exists, the challenge lies on the diff~culty of other 
interested parties to access it. In the context of Asia in general, Morgan et al. (2007) concluded that it is 
difficult for the interested parties to access the latest information pertaining to IUU fishing and fishing 
capacity due to two reason: (i). Much of the information is restricted by the country's Ministries; and (ii). 
Neither of the information has been frequently published in media nor widely available @. 3). This in turn 
has led to a state of affair where fisheries managers and policymakers have been unable to make informed 
decision in establishing a sound fisheries development policy and responsible fisheries management 
regime within their own national EEZ. Because of the inadequacy, unreliabiIity and inaccuracy of the 
biological/ecologica1 information and fisheries statistical data, some coastal States have in the past 
delayed and even failed to establish effective and coordinated regional cooperation in fisheries 
management. 
To overcome the above problems, the concerned States need to consider of establishing and strengthening 
cooperative mechanism designed to facilitate the exchange of information and data on fisheries among the 
interested parties, This approach should not only focus on integrated and systematic collection and 
dissemination of data relating to both shared and transboundary fish species, but also the analysis and 
interpretation the data. On the whole, the quality and quantity of scientific data and information on 
fisheries science and technology on transboundary shared stocks can only be enhanced through joint 
partnership with all parties sharimg and harvesting the concerned stocks. 
ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
One of the recommended measures to effectively manage transboundary shared fishery stocks is through 
the adoption of ecosystem approach to fisheries management (EM) in regional cooperative arrangement. 
It is desirable for transboundary shared fishery stock to be managed over their entire area of biological 
distribution, which in the context of Southeast Asia, covering not only different areas of national 
jurisdiction but also a myriad and unique marine ecosystem and habitats. Accordingly, given the close 
interactions and interdependency between shared fishery stocks and their surrounding ecosystem, the 
destruction of fragile fisheries habitats and loss of biodiversity would likely have detrimental impact on 
the overall health of stocks concerned. For this reason, the principle of EAF entails cooperation among 
relevant governments, and regional fisheries and environment organizations to conserve, protect and 
restore the health and integrity of the regional ecosystem and its habitat. This collaborative approach is 
critical given that biological and physical components of ecosystems in the region, as previously pointed 
out, typically extend beyond the jurisdictional boundary of a single State. Moreover, EAF has generally 
been perceived to be more efficient and effective in addressing environmental problems of a 
transboundary nature than the initiatives taken by individual States alone. This signifies a departure from 
the traditional species-centric management approach (Ahmad, 201 1). Nevertheless, many commentators 
agreed that the EAF is not envisioned as a revolutioriary approach deviating from the conventional 
fisheries management regime (Sinclair et al., 2002, p. 264). It is rather seen as an approach embracing a 
more integrated and holistic way of managing resources without disregarding fragile fisheries 
environment and its habitats (FAO, 2005). 
In giving effect to the EM, littoral States sharing the same fishery stocks need to implement a number of 
measures. States should adopt f~heries conservation and management measures with the aim of not only 
ensuring the long-term sustainability of fish stocks but also protecting and maintaining marine aquatic 
ecosystem within which the stocks live. The LOSC, in particular, accords special protection to marine 
ccosystcm and its components, including diffcrcnt groups of fish spccics (is. targct or non-targct) and 
fragile habitats. In line with this obligation, coastal States under Article 61(3) must take into consideration 
the dynamic interaction and interdependence between fish stocks and marine ecosystem when deciding 
the appropriate conservation measures to prevent overfishing in the EEZ. 
Moreover, as stipulated in Article 6.8 of 1995 Code of Conduct, EAF entails coastal States to ensure the 
marine aquatic ecosystem and its habitats are subject to protection against the harmful impact of human 
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activities. In giving effect to this principle, the Code has made it clear that States must establish 
appropriate measures for prohibiting the use of poison (e.g. cyanide fishing), dynamite (e.g. fish 
bombing) and other destructive fishing practices (eg. rnuroarnr fishing and towed-bottom fishing gear, 
including pair trawling, push nets and otter trawling) (Art. 8.4.2). The Code also places stronger 
emphasis on regional collaborative arrangements and coordinated efforts to develop and implement 
environmentally friendly fishing gear, technology, and operational methods, which reduce the loss of 
fishing gear (Art. 8.4.6). 
Reducing the incidence of by-catch and discard mortality in fisheries population underpins the key 
management measures under the EAF framework. Littoral States needs to cooperate and make a firm 
commitment towards protecting non-targeted species (i.e. juvenile and low-value species) against 
indiscriminate catching. A widespread practice of by-catch and a high rate of discard mortality of 
undesirable marine species are increasingly becoming a norm in tropical multi-species resources and 
multi-gear fisheries in the regional EEZs. An obvious example of this problem can he seen in the 
quantity of trash fish generated from by-catch of both coastal and offshore fishing activities, which 
constituting the highest percentage of species composition landed in Malaysia, W a n d  and Indonesia. 
Thus, it is in the best interest of regional governments to cooperate in conserving target fishery resources 
and protecting non-target species from incidental capture by unselective fishing gears and methods. 
Achieving this objective would necessitate cooperative technical management measures, and common 
legislative and policy instruments. More specitically, the aforementioned measures may include inter- 
agency projects for developing technologically advanced selective fishing gear, community-outreach 
education programs, and regulatory restrictions on gear and mesh sue. 
STRENGTHENING OF MONITORING, CONTROLLING AND SURVEILLANCE (MCS) SYSTEM 
Interstate cooperative arrangement in monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) activities for fisheries 
is broadly viewed as one of the integral elements of ensuring regional transboundmy fish stocks are to be 
harvested in a sustainable manner. Wide spectrums of MCS measures have been commonly implemented 
at national level with most of their implementation have been strengthened by legislative, policy and 
institutional reforms. These government initiatives focus on tightening of fishing and vessel licensing 
conditions, adopting stringent sanctions and effective prosecution against fisheries offenders, and 
enhancing fisheries law enforcement and monitoring capability. These national efforts may have 
improved the conservation of shared fishery resources at national fisheries jurisdictional waters, but 
arguably fall shall short of protecting the overall population of the resources in question throughout their 
entire spatial migratory range. Exacerbating the problems of fisheries law enforcement in the region is the 
absence of formalized regional mechanism with command function to coordinate fisheries surveillance 
and enforcement operations, coupled by limited enforcement capability and capacity suffered by 
individual coastal States. Insofar as vessel boarding and inspections are concerned, there is gap in the 
standardized operational procedures at regional level. Consequently, the aforementioned challenges 
provide reasons why littoral States should take into consideration of institutionalizing a coordinated MCS 
system at regional level. 
Joint surveillance and law enforcement exercise become even more critical due the enormous size of 
individual EEZ and fishing grounds to cover in the Southeast Asian region The prohibitive operational 
costs of implementing MCS measures - a situation that placed heavy burden to many regional developing 
States - can be equally shared or even lessened through the coordinated use of maritime surveillance and 
enforcement assets. Concerted action and cooperation in MCS becomes more acute when managing 
transboundary fish stocks. Because of varying socio-economic interests and dierent management 
approach among the States to regulate those stocks in their respective EEZs, there is an obvious need for 
coord'mated MCS measures applicable throughout the entire migratory range of the concerned stocks. To 
add, much more needs to be done on strengthening fisheries surveillance and enforcement efforts among 
ASEAN countries given that IUU fishing incidents have long been pervasive in the regional waters. 
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Institutionalized mechanism for joint fisheries law enforcement, as stated earlier, is currently non- 
existence in the regional water; with the cooperative programs on fisheries surveillance and law 
enforcement have been mostly focused on intelligence and information sharing on illegal fishing 
activities. Different cooperative arrangements involving ASEAN members are presently in place. There 
are already examples relating to such arrangements, such as coordinated maritime surface and aerial 
patrol initiative aimed at addressing non-traditional security challenges, including transnational crimes 
(e.g. piracy, sea robbery and human trafficking), and promoting navigational safety (e.g. search and 
rescue) in the Malacca Straits (Koh, 2013). Other relevant example of maritime surveillance and law 
enforcement cooperation arrangement in the region is the agreement signed Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Brunei and Indonesia, which have agreed to conduct regular joint patrol in border areas surrounding the 
Celebes Sea (Jakarta Post, 2005). While the ultimate objective of these joint patrol exercises is to secure 
overall maritime security in the regional waters, subsidiary benefit generated from these collaborative 
efforts is likely to spill over towards the protection of fisheries resources from the threat of illicit 
activities, such as IUU fishing (e.g. foreign fishing encroachment, fish bombing, unauthorized 
transhipment of fish at sea). 
A number of joint actions relevant to strengthening the existing MCS system can be implemented by the 
regional littoral States. These include exchange of intelligent information on IUU fishing activities, 
formulate standardize procedure for catch documentation, vessel inspection and boarding, and establish 
coordinated port State control measure for fishing vessels. The fact that "no country can go alone" in 
fisheries enforcement and surveillance efforts reinforces the need to develop a stronger cooperation and 
coordination betweenlamong neighbouring States sharing the said resources. 
CONCLUSION 
A prerequisite to any present and future policy direction at reaching a more meaningful cooperation for 
sustainable and equitable management of transboundary shared fishery stocks necessitates a close 
engagement and strong political will among the neighboring ASEAN States. Because the geographical 
distribution of these transboundary shared stocks typically spanning across multiples jurisdictional zones, 
interstate cooperation for the management of such stocks has become increasingly critical. Given this 
circumstance, even comprehensive conservation efforts of an individual State within its national 
jurisdictional waters might be rendered futile. Further reason for reinforcing the need to increase the level 
and scope of regional cooperation and coordination is the ongoing overlapping maritime boundary 
disputes and contested maritime features in large portions of national EEZs. Whilst the definite resolution 
of overlapping maritime boundary and features remains the subject of political and diplomatic 
negotiation, it is not an excuse for the affected States not to pursue some form of cooperative measures 
to protect and regulate the access to these shared fishery resources. This warrants proactive and collective 
government intervention and participation aimed at securing a more equitable and responsible fisheries 
management and long-term utilization of resources in the region. 
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